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Four decades after the emergence of International Political Economy (IPE) in the 
early 1970s as a branch of International scholarship (Cohen 2008, Denemark & 
O’Brien 1997: Gill and Law 1988), the nature, boundaries and intellectual 
ancestries of this field of study are still hotly disputed. Even the label IPE is under 
dispute: Gill and Law (1988: xxiii), for instance, prefer the term ‘Global Political 
Economy’ (GPE), privileging the global arena over inter-national relationships. 
Nowadays the two labels are used interchangeably, although the denomination IPE 
is generally adopted by those who view this field of study as a sub-field of political 
science and International Relations, whereas GPE is normally the preferred label 
for those who view it as a transdisciplinary effort, closer to political economy then to 
International Relations. I will use the GPE label in this introductory chapter. 
 Behind the veneer of contestation, IPE or GPE represents a community of 
scholars from a variety of social sciences discipline that share something important 
in common. It is easier, however, to describe what they share in common in negative 
terms, as a critique of other approaches, whereas it is more difficult to agree upon 
much else. I tend to think of the field of IPE/GPE, therefore, not as a distinct 
academic discipline, but as a suggestive research program that brings together 
studies from a range of social sciences disciplines that either implicitly or explicitly 
take seriously two set of propositions.  
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 First: that an international economy that operates in an environment that is 
divided among sovereign states of various power and size is profoundly 
different from an international economy that inhabits some abstract and 
integrated space imagined in conventional international economics textbooks 
 Second: that the dynamics of political action in a world of that is witnessing 
an increasingly integrated and integrating economy is very different from the 
one imagined in conventional political science and international relations.  
How different is that the ‘real’ world of a global political economy that operates in a 
state system from the one imagined by economists and/or conventional political 
science/international relations, and more crucially, how should we go about 
conceptualizing the differences has never been settled.  
 In very broad terms, GPE approached the conundrums of global political 
economy from two related perspectives: From a broad theoretical perspective that 
serve the ‘general theoretical orientations’ (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner ? 
**?..) in political economy, and from related development in key themes or concepts 
in the field, such as the state, power, capital, trade, finance and so on. As GPE is 
closely related to political economy, it also adopted with various degree of success 
the four general theoretical orientations that have dominated political economy. 
These are standard economics, sometimes referred to as neoclassical economics; 
Marxian or radical political economy, evolutionary political economy (or 
evolutionary institutionalism), and the least known, but equally important, libidinal 
political economy. Standard economics make up the current orthodoxy in the field of 
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IPE; the rest fill the contested area that is heterodoxy in GPE. The four general 
theoretical orientations often diverge on issues of substance, but also on the 
questions of philosophy, methodology and ethics.  
 Standard economics and Marxist political economies tend to share, however, 
in the words of Gammon and Wigan (chapter 16), the rationality postulate, which 
‘views motivation in terms of pleasure seeking and pain avoidance.’ Standard 
economics and Marxist political economy diverge, however, on the sort of questions 
they believe must be at the core questions of GPE. Standard GPE addresses 
questions such as: Why states fail to pursue the optimal course of action by 
imposing tariffs on their trading partners‘ goods and services ? (Carlson, Dacey, 
chapter 8); what explains the decisions made by individuals over economic issues? 
(Elms, chapter 9); what is the role of institutions in shaping economic behaviour 
(Spruyt, chapter 10). Marxist theory, in contrast, is concerned primarily with 
processes of exploitation and asymmetrical access to power and resources on a 
global scale (Dunford chapter 12; Overbeek, chapter 13).  Evolutionary approaches, 
in contrast, tend to view the acquisitive individual, or homo economicus of standard 
economics, as representative of a certain historical ‘habits of thought’, and hence not 
a particularly useful starting point of investigation (Nitzan and Bichler, chapter 4; 
Schwartz, chapter 12, and to some extent, Broome, chapter 15). Whereas libidinal 
theories question the basic assumptions of standard economic: they question 
whether individuals are maximising anything in particular. Instead, they believe, 
that individuals are strategising to achieve the conditions that Freud described as 
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primary narcissism (Gammon and Wigan, chapter 16 and Ling, chapter 19). Each of 
these general orientation yields, unsurprisingly, very different perspectives on the 
world.  
 The four general theoretical orientations tend to diverge also on other 
fundamental questions, for instance, on the nature and meaning of capitalism and 
capital. Standard economics regards capitalism essentially as a market economy 
(contrasts, for instance, with a planned economy). The institution of the market is 
seen as one of the greatest achievements of humanity. Markets techniques of 
organization and co-ordination of human societies based on the free interchange of 
communication between people. The freer the exchange, the better they function. 
Standard economics share much more with libidinal economy than may appear at 
first glance. Both view markets essentially as ‘economies of desire’. Markets are 
communication devices employing the medium of the prices mechanism to transmit 
and communicate people’ desires for goods, services or non-material values. The 
theories diverge, however, in their reading of what desires are about, and how 
individual express them. Standard economics believes that individuals are trying to 
maximize their lot, mostly material lot, in this world. Libidinal economists asks, if 
that is so, why then so many individuals appear to desire their own oppression or 
even their personal annihilation? Why do so many people seem to be prepared to 
sacrifice their own life, in name of abstract concepts such as God, the nation or the 
working classes?   
 Marxists, in contrast, view capitalism as a variant on an existential theme, 
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the theme of exploitation by one (group) of people by another. World history – that 
is the history of sedentary people – is a history of class struggle. And we are still 
struggling today. Evolutionary economists believe, in contrast, that the concept of 
capitalism is a misnomer. Capitalism has evolved towards the end of the nineteenth 
century into something else. They call it, business civilization. Businesses are 
viewed as ‘going concerns’, and capital nowadays is primarily ‘intangible’, 
representing what in accounting and legal language is defined as ‘goodwill’. 
Intangible capital is denominated as the capitalization of business concerns based 
on their anticipated earnings discounted against current rate of interests. Today, 
business and the businessmen, and their techniques of buying and selling 
dominates the ‘economic’ agenda (Nitzan and Bichler, 4).  
 Standard economics derived IPE is broadly associated with the ‘American 
school in IPE’: meticulous, exact, and parsimonious. This school has tended to stress 
analytical rigorousness over conceptual innovation, critical methodological 
thoroughness at the cost of asking some of the ‘big questions’ of the nature of the 
status quo of our time (Cohen 2008). The rest, Marxian, evolutionary 
institutionalists and libidinal theories, have tended, on the whole to be associated 
with the ‘British’ or continental schools (although the evolutionary approach were 
very American to start with). They tend to stress conceptual innovation (sometimes) 
at the cost of some analytical clarity; preferring to answer ‘big questions’, but not 
necessarily new answers to the traditional questions of economics or politics.  
 We have, therefore, many approaches to choose from in the study of GPE. 
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Should we pay attention to all four? Most GPE textbooks clearly favor one over the 
rest. I tend to be pragmatic on such matters: I ask whether the whole is more than 
the sum of its parts? I think it is. Hence, I think that we should pay attention to 
recent developments among the four.  Indeed, it is noticeable how the combined 
effects of the two sets of related theoretical developments (among the general 
theoretical orientations, and specific research programs) have shifted our 
understanding of the nature of the global political economy since the publications of 
the first edition of this volume in 2000. The change in perspectives are due partly to 
the tremendous developments in the world ‘out there’; but partially because of 
(often) grudging acceptance of the validity of some of the arguments put forwards by 
each other – for example, the concept of GPE is now increasingly acceptable to both 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy (Lake) ; whereas formalism that was nearly the exclusive 
terrain of orthodoxy is now adopted increasingly by heterodoxy as well.  
 And then, there are important issues that concern us all. There are diverse 
topics: changes in the nature of the state (Moore, chapter 2), business and the 
corporation (Phillips, chapter 3) power and capital (Nitzan and Bichler., chapter 4), 
labour (O’Brien, chapter 5), finance (Nesvetailova, chapter 6), Globalization 
(McMichael, chapter 7), ecology (Dalby, Katz-Rosene, Paterson, chapter 15), the rise 
of China (Beeson, chapter 18), and the future of alternative politics (Ling, chapter 
19). 
 I also think that an informed reader would like… well, to be informed, before 
they reach their own conclusion. This volume is intended, therefore, to serve 
 7 
precisely such purpose. This volume charts this shifting zonal terrain that marks 
the outer boundaries of contemporary European, American and developmental in 
IPE and GPE. Our intention here is not to adjudicate among competing approaches, 
but to inform and educate the reader who may find it difficult to keep abreast of the 
range of scholarship that is relevant to contemporary GPE scholarship. A cursory 
acquaintance with GPE reveals it to be a broad and somewhat inchoate field of 
study. While the great majority of GPE texts still give the impression of a field 
divided into three, so-called ‘paradigms’, realism, liberalism and structuralism, it is 
evident that contemporary GPE has by and large moved on to a considerable 
degree. GPE has absorbed and, in turn, has been absorbed into, the broader trends 
in the social sciences loosening in the process its ties to the discipline of 
International Relations. As a result, the main division lines in contemporary GPE 
no longer trail International Relations' controversies, but reflect broader issues and 
contemporary debates in political economy and the social sciences.  
 This introductory chapter maps out contemporary debates in GPE. I stress in 
particular the rising in significance of the methodological debate between, on the 
one hand, rationalist and methodologically individualist approaches, and on the 
other, the critical or post-rationalist traditions.ii  The book is divided into three 
parts. Part one focuses on six of the central concepts of GPE: state, firm, capital, 
power, labour and globalisation, each of which is increasingly subjected to a 
rigorous and critical evaluation. These are not necessarily the six fundamental 
concepts of GPE, but they are the six that have been the subject of the greatest 
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debate and innovation in the past two decades. Part Two covers a select number of 
theories, currently at the forefront of GPE. These theories and approaches are 
drawn from the three broad traditions of rationalism, Marxism and 
institutionalism. Part III discusses some of the important issues, issues that are 
likely to dominate future agenda: ecology,  
 
1.1  The Epistemological Foundations of Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy 
 
At one level, the debates that is taking place in GPE replicate important debates in 
the social sciences more generally. The concern the utility of salience of a range of 
approaches that are described as orthodoxy, and a range of approaches that are 
described as heterodoxy. The dispute is largely of epistemological nature, although 
in more practical terms, it takes shape as a methodological debate. At its core, the 
dispute is about the most efficient and useful ways by which we should go about 
investigating the nature of the ‘units’ out there, and the relationship they establish 
between them over time.  
 Orthodoxy in the social sciences is predicated on the assumption that the best 
available methodologies are drawn from a genre of theories that mathematicians 
call discrete graph theory. Discrete graph theory is a branch of mathematics and 
logic that is dealing with objects that can assume only distinct, separated values 
(like discrete numbers, 1,2,3 and so on). (For excellent discussion see: Easeley and 
Kleinberg 2010).  
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Figure 1: Discrete Mathematic Graphs (Wilson and Watson 1989). 
      







Discrete graph theory is contrasted with another branch of graph theory called, 
‘continuous graph theory.’ Continuous graph theory deals with objects that can vary 
smoothly like liquefied or gaseous topological forms. In other words, objects of 
irregular shape and size. It also deals with cases of species sharing a habitat, how 
each develops its own ecological niche between and among the different species (See 
Graph II). 
 






Many of the important debates in the social sciences broadly, and GPE 
specifically, are concerned with the utility and scope of discrete graphs as 
explanation of the behaviour of people and organisations (such as states or firms) 
that populate our mental images of the social world. Orthodoxy is associated in the 
social science, on the whole, with covering law type of generalizations based on 
correlations, statistical probabilities or even intuition, attributing universal 
behavioural characteristics to discrete entities. Charles Tilly describes covering law 
accounts in the following terms: ‘In covering law accounts, explanation consists of 
subjecting robust empirical generalizations to higher- and higher-level 
generalizations, the most general of all standing as laws... Investigators search for 
necessary and sufficient conditions of stipulated outcomes, those outcomes often 
conceived of as dependent variables’ (Tilly 2001, 23). Formal modelling techniques, 
quantification and methodological questions tend to dominate orthodox inquiries of 
behaviour in the social world.  
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While the precise meaning of heterodoxy in the social science is contested, 
broadly, heterodoxy theories are founded on the assumption that the ‘units’ of the 
social world, be they individuals, states or any other organisations are driven by 
diverse, often conflicting sets of motivations and rationales. Causation in a social 
world has to be demonstrated inductively, rather than deductively. Social scientific 
inquiry is descriptive (or historical), open-ended, empirical and continuous.  
Redding’s points out to three shared core assumptions that define the 
heterodox position: they sound like description of Graph II: 
(a) There are multiple and complex connections and constant flows of 
reciprocal influences between social phenomena. 
(b) The phenomena themselves change over time. 
(c) Social systems are open to new external influences that affect them as 
they evolve. So because the social world is in constant flux, attempts to 
understand it based on Newtonian physics [e.g. discrete graph models], 
where units of analysis are fixed and relations between them permanent 
are misapplied (Redding 2005, 128). 
Many heterodox scholars maintain, furthermore, that the social sciences are 
‘second-order fields, in that they can only study phenomena through the medium of 
people’s conceptions of what is going on’ (Redding, 2005, 128). The medium of 
thinking and language is considered opaque. That is, the diverse techniques that 
structure or determine the way by which humans produce a mental picture of the 
world ‘out there,’ such as narratives rules, imagination and ideology, are considered 
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salient to the investigative process itself (Cameron and Palan 2004).  
Heterodox scholars have tended to use formal modelling techniques less 
frequently than orthodox scholars. That may partly to do with the technical 
difficulties most of us are having with complexitie s of continuous graph theory, but 
also due to an intuitive belief that the complexities of the social world are best 
approached historically and empirically. 
 
Where Orthodoxy Is Heading to Today: Beyond State and Firm 
 
In a talk given at the 1996 annual conference of the European Association for 
Evolutionary Political Economy Paul Krugman define economics in the following 
terms: 
 
“1. Economics is about what ‘individuals’ do: not classes, not ‘correlations 
of forces’, but individual actors. This is not to deny the relevance of higher levels 
of analysis, but they must be grounded in individual behavior. Methodological 
individualism is of the essence.  
2. The individuals are self-interested. There is nothing in economics that 
inherently prevents us from allowing people to derive satisfaction from others' 
consumption, but the predictive power of economic theory comes from the 
presumption that normally people care about themselves.  
3. The individuals are intelligent: obvious opportunities for gain are not 
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neglected. Hundred-dollar bills do not lie unattended in the street for very long.  
4. We are concerned with the ‘interaction’ of such individuals: Most interesting 
economic theory, from supply and demand on, is about the ‘invisible hand’; 
processes in which the collective outcome is not what individuals intended.’ 
(Krugman, 1996, 2). 
  
Krugman alludes to a particular tradition of political economy that has evolved out 
of economics when he talks about ‘higher levels of analysis.’ The reference is to the 
fledgling field of economic approaches to politics or as it sometimes called, ‘new 
political economy’ -- a very different set of literature to the ‘new international 
political economy’ that Murphy and Tooze (1991) espouse. These are sets of theories 
that adopt neoclassical conceptual armouary to explain the determinants of 
policymaking (or preference formation). For example, new political economy state 
theory maintains that government policies can be explained with the aid of concepts 
such as marginalism, optimization, equilibrium (Meier 1990,185).  As opposed to 
conventional International Relations, the new political economy disaggregates the 
state and views it as ‘simply another of the myriad institutions contained in any 
society, owned of necessity by certain individuals and not by others (Auster and 
Silver 1979:21). The state however is a privileged institution. Domestically, the 
state behaves as a `natural monopoly' and the `surplus' that the state maximizes is 
a sort of a monopoly `rent' that the sovereign can enjoy. As a result, the surplus that 
the state garners attracts hordes of office-seekers and other interests anxious to get 
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their hands on it.   
 The state is viewed therefore as an exogenous factor introducing friction and 
disequilibrium into the proper functioning of the market. Markets, alas, never work 
as they are supposed to in theory because of the tremendous impacts states are 
having.  Among OECD countries, for instance, nearly 40% of GDP is routed, in one 
way or another, through the state.  Whereas states have gobbled considerable 
portions of markets, large firms swallowed a good portion of the rest (Phillips, 
chapter 3). A pure theory of markets is simply unrealistic in such conditions. 
 At the same time, politicians cannot ignore the political imperatives produced 
by the markets as well, even if these markets are dominated by hierarchies. In 
modern capitalist economies, ‘the entire society depends on the allocation of 
resources chosen by owners of capital... continues with the inference that because 
the entire society depends on the owners of capital, so must the state.’ (Pres. **12) 
So whereas political science and international relations assume that ‘particular 
governments have interests and goals of their own or they act on behalf of a 
coalition of groups or a class, the pursuit of any objectives that require material 
resources places governments in the situation of structural dependence. Politicians 
seeking re-election must anticipate the impact of their policies on the decisions of 
firms because these decisions affect employment, inflation, and personal income of 
voters: vote-seeking politicians are dependent on owners of capital because voters 
are’ (12). 
 States can hardly be assumed independent, the way some IR theorists have 
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tended to assume. The pure theories of politics and economics tell us very little 
about actual behaviour. The field of IPE (and increasingly GPE) seek to bridge that 
divide between theory and reality. Conceptually, the field start from the 
assumption, in the words of Robert Gilpin, that  
 
"The parallel existence and mutual interaction of 'state' and 'market' in the 
modern world create 'political economy'... In the absence of state, the price 
mechanism and market forces would determine the outcome of economic 
activities; this would be the pure world of the economist. In the absence of 
market, the state or its equivalent would allocate economic resources; this 
would be the pure world of political scientist" (Gilpin 1987 p.8).iii 
 
1.4. Marxian Political Economy 
 
Marxist theory never accepted the conventional dividing lines of academia and 
certainly never adopted the analytical division between domestic and international 
politics. If anything, Marxism proceeds from a unified theory of political economy, a 
global political economy.  For Marxism the central institution of the modern world 
is capital and hence the dominant social institution is that of capitalism.  
 Capitalism is defined as a social system based on the profit motive and the 
dominance of commodity relations, including the commodification of labour. The 
rise of capitalism as the dominant social institution entailed a set of profound 
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socioeconomic transformations, including the dominance of contractual relationship 
over familial and coercive relationships, the rise of capitalist law and the capitalist 
state.  One strand of Marxism maintains, rather problematically, that political and 
‘cultural’ transformations are the unwitting results of the rise of capitalism. In 
other words, societal, political and ideological transformations are merely 
by-products of the changing ‘material conditions of life.’ Modern Marxist thought 
strives however to transcend this base/superstructure model with a more nuanced 
historical and holistic political economic accounts. 
 Marx viewed capitalism as a particular ‘logic’ that imposes itself historically. 
Capital was first and foremost a self-expanding value. Capitalism expands in a 
series of waves: at certain historical periods capitalism tends to expand spatially 
penetrating new and distant markets. In other periods, capitalism deepens its grip 
on social life. These two types of expansionary tendencies can form the backgroud of 
an holistic account of diverse developments, from the colonialism of 19th century 
capitalism, to the formation of the Bretton Woods system in the 20th century and 
the rise of globalization towards the 21st century (McMichael, chapter 7). At the 
same time, Marxist political economy also accounts for the deepening of capitalist 
social relations and the extension and commodification of all aspects of social life. 
With its emphasis on capital, Marxist political economy, therefore, subsumes GPE 
within a broader theory of society and history. In fact, since the 1930s, Marxist 
thinkers like Benjamin, Adorno and Horkenheimer, and more recently Deleuze and 
Guattari and Hardt and Negri were predicating what Lyotard (1986) called the 
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‘post-modern’ condition as the furthest extension of subsumption of society under 
capital.   
 Marxist GPE analyses institutions in three ways:  
(A) While new institutionalism views institutions as historically emergent solutions 
to market failure (Spruyt, this volume), Marxists view institutions primarily as 
forms of the institutionalization of power (Poulantzas 1968). According to this 
theory, social classes entrench their gains by normalizing and institutionalizing 
them. Institutions contain therefore layer upon layer of embedded class gains. In 
time, these gains are so deeply entrenched that institutions such as the state, the 
family, the firm and the like, appear to be class neutral and are widely accepted as 
such. We need to reflect carefully upon persistent inequalities and power 
differentials to begin to unravel the class nature of these institutions and the 
manner by which they ensure the persistence of power differentials. 
(B) Contemporary Marxist theory maintains however that institutions cannot be 
reduced exclusively to the above; they are, in addition representative of the complex 
manner of the changing nature of the material base. The institutional constitution 
of the contract, private property, democracy and so on are not directly determined 
by capital, but over-determined by the central institution of capital. 
(C) In addition, certain key institutions, particularly the state, have an important 
remedial role to play in class divided societies. The state cannot be viewed simply as 
the epiphenomenon of the materialist base, or simply as a tool in the hands of the 
ruling class. The state has evolved structures that contribute to the long-term 
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survival of capitalist relationships. So the state entrenches ruling class power and 
interest and yet at the same time it must remain relatively autonomous of these 
interests (Poulantzas 1968). 
 With its emphasis on the complex, class-based nature of institutions, 
Marxism provides GPE with two strong hypotheses. The first concerns the issue of 
development, which is central to all branches of political economy. For neoclassical 
development theory the solution to development is quite simple: let market forces 
do their job. Considering the relatively low level of industrialization among the less 
developed countries, the law of diminishing returns suggests that the bulk of 
international investment should have been directed towards third world countries.  
 The law of diminishing return predicts therefore faster rate of economic 
growth among the less developed countries. This, of course, has not happened until 
fairly recently.  On the contrary, the post-war world economy exhibited traditional 
patterns of concentration and centralization of capital. In one interpretation, the 
one favoured by the World Bank, the IMF and so on, such disturbing counterfactual 
evidence does not invalidate the law of diminishing return or the broader 
theoretical edifice of ‘developmental economics.’ On the contrary, the failure of 
development is due (again!) to ‘exogenous factors, ` namely, the failure of third 
world countries’ to develop appropriate political systems. Thus, modernization 
theory, which is closely allied to neoclassical economics, prescribes changes in the 
domestic political system of developing countries combined with open markets and 
free competition worldwide. In this light recent development of emerging markets 
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forces profound rethink of Marxist thought (Dunford; Beeson).  
 Marxism maintains however the centrality of the law of uneven development 
so that ‘imperialist expansion on the one hand, and monopolistic developments on 
the other, give a new lease of life to the capital system, markedly delaying the time 
of its saturation’ (Mészáros 1995,34). The ideal of global market equilibrium is 
delayed and ‘sabotaged’ in order to ensure higher profits margins. In a number of 
ways, neo-Marxism introduces then the issue of hierarchy and power into the 
analysis of the world economy.  Thus, in contrast to Keynes’ ‘frightful muddles,’ 
Marxism incorporates into the core of its theoretical edifice precisely those elements 
that economics treats as ‘exogenous’ or contingent. As a result it reaches 
diametrically opposed conclusions to those favoured by standard economics. 
 The second strong Marxist hypothesis concerns the issue of transnational or 
so-called global governance. Marxism reminds us that bourgeois ideology seeks to 
eliminate labour from the analysis. Growth and economic welfare is attributed to 
the invisible hand of the market, to the acumen of the modern CEO, to the 
successful policies of government, to technology, but certainly not to the sweat and 
toil of the millions upon millions of worker that make up the ‘economic system’. But 
labour is the ‘hidden’ substructure of the modern economy, both as the true 
producer of goods and services and the ignored but ever-present face of resistance. 
Michel Aglietta argues that classical Marxists failed to appreciate that 
labour-power is not a commodity like all the others (Aglietta 1979, 46). In contrast 
to the homogenised or ‘fungible’ nature of the commodity-form, labour-power can be 
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incorporated into capital as wage-labour only in certain definite labour processes. 
Consequently, society, which includes social and political relationship is pivotal to 
the organisation of labour and hence cannot be considered ‘external’ or exogenous to 
the economic system. The question of global governance, then, is the question of the 
global governance of labour and the maintenance of transnational class hierarchies 
(see O'Brien this volume).  Indeed, the French school of regulation with its focus on 
the relationship between capital and labour explains to us why an already 
transnational capitalism takes a sudden ‘national’ turn in the 1930s and only from 
the 1970s has become ‘global’ again.  
 Marxism then provides GPE with a critical and holistic interpretation of the 
modern economy as a global political economy, viewed as a set of structures, 
patterns and relationships that can only be understood with the aid of a 
political-economic, as opposed to either political or economic interpretation. 
 
1.5. The Return of Institutionalism  
 
 In ‘the legal foundations of capitalism’, John Commons distinguish among three 
traditions of economic thought: classical economics of Adam Smith, David Ricardo 
and Karl Marx centered on production and the commodity, the ‘hedonist economists’ 
such as Bantham, Senior, Jevons, Clark, who concerned themselves with the 
subjective side of economic theory,iv and volitional theories of economics associated 
with thinkers such as Hume, Malthus, Carey, Bastiat, Cassel, Anderson, and 
especially, the Supreme Court of the United State. Volitional, or as it is now called, 
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evolutionary economics, ‘start, not with a commodity or with a feeling, but with the 
purposes of the future, revealing themselves in rules of conduct governing 
transactions which give rise to rights, duties, liberties, private property, 
governments and associations’ (Commons 1959:4). 
 John Common and Thorstein Veblen are the high priests of this tradition. 
They argue persuasively that towards the end of the 19th century, the law Courts in 
the United States have effectively altered the nature of private property laws, and 
by doing orchestrated a mutation in the institutional framework of capitalist 
economy, ushering quite distinct form of capitalism from the one described by Marx. 
Private property turned from an exclusive right to holding of physical objects for the 
owner's private uses, to a principle of control of limited resources needed by others.v 
Such property is in essence ‘intangible’. 
 According to Commons, these momentous events took place between the 
years I872 and I897. In a number of important rulings the US law Courts effectively 
altered the traditional meaning of property which meant ‘any tangible thing owned’ 
to mean, ‘any of the expected activities implied with regard to the thing owned’, 
‘comprehended in the activities of acquiring, using and disposing of the thing. One 
is Property, the other is Business. The one is property in the sense of the Things 
owned the other is property in the sense of exchange-value of things. One is physical 
objects, the other is marketable assets’ (1959, 18). The original meaning of property, 
the owning of things, did not disappear, but was relegated to what may be described 
as the internal 'economy' of a going concern (the firm) or a household. Our 
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perception of our personal private property still corresponds, by and large, to the 
older, corporeal view of property. Modern capitalism however is concerned almost 
exclusively with the non-corporeal property. General Motors’s management and 
shareholders, for instance, are not particularly concerned with the use-value of GM 
cars, machine tools and so on, but with their exchange-value, their marketability. 
But as Nitzan and Bichler note:’ exchange-value is not corporeal- it is behaviorist. It 
is the market value expected to be obtained in exchange for the thing in any of the 
markets where the thing can or might be sold.’ The value of one’s holding becomes 
capitalized earning capacity (Nitzan and Bichler, this volume)..  
 What is the value of a company, say, IBM? Is it the value of IBM is an 
aggregation of the values of its machines, real estate, ‘knowledge’ and managerial 
practices? Classical political economy and Marxism appear to suggest so. There is 
however another way of measuring the value of IBM and that is, its valuation of the 
company in the stock market. What determines the latest market value of an IBM 
share? The price is determined by what buyers are prepared to pay for these shares. 
Buyers reach their decision primarily on the basis of their estimate either of the 
company’s future earning capacity or their perception of other buyers’ perception of 
the company’s future earning capacity. In other words, the value of IBM is entirely 
subjective. The value of IBM, therefore, is an entirely ‘subjective’ proposition; it is 
based on aggregate estimates of the future and not on any corporeal assets. 
Accountants define the difference between replacement value of company’s asset, 
and its value in the market (which tends to be higher—although interestingly, in 
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crisis times such as the one experienced as I write this words, some companies trade 
at lower rate than the replacement value of their assets!) as ‘good will’. It is 
estimated that the vast majority of wealth in the world is in fact denominated in 
‘good will’.  
 These ideas then form the theoretical underpinnings of evolutionary 
economics, the implication of which are discussed in particular in chapters by 
Phillips, Nitzan and Bichler and Schwartz, The question that neither Commons nor 
Veblen sought to answer was whether the changes in the concept of private 
property and the concomitant transformation of capitalism can be described purely 
in institutionalist terms, or whether there were some 'exogenous' material interests 
that determined the sort of choices that were made. Was it not the case, as Hardt 
and Negri (1994) argue that jurists were actively seeking to accommodate the needs 
of capitalist accumulation?  Is it not the case, after all, that a Marxist political 
economic theory can accommodate Veblenian institutionalism? This remains an 
open question. But the perception of the market as an institution has become 
central to modern GPE. 
 
1.6 Towards post-rationalist GPEvi 
 
Although different, the three ‘residues’ of classical political economy share 
rationalist epistemology – although even that is debated with regards to the 
evolutionary approaches. State or transnational firms are assumed to be rational, 
calculating ‘actors’, with clear - usually utility-maximising - preferences and goals 
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(from power to profits).  Differences in opinion tend to focus on whether the actors 
are individuals or institutions and whether the choices are constrained or not by 
information and knowledge gap or uncertainty. But what if everyday, recurring, 
phenomena which imply that the world is not a rational order driven by a set of 
universal rules, iron laws, or systemic logic?   
 There is evidence for a growing interest in post-rationalist (not 
anti-rationalist) modes of explanations in GPE. Post-rationalism consists of sets of 
theories that explain order - and disorder - as the product of institutional and 
historical continuity, formal and informal rules of conduct, social and institutional 
interaction, common pathologies, consciousness and language, conflict and contest, 
and so on.   
 Broadly speaking, post-rationalist GPE adopts an open-ended historical 
narrative in which outcomes are not predictable, but negotiated and contested, with 
each actor-network perpetually frightened of loss or stasis. States and multinational 
enterprises are viewed no longer simply as instrumentalist advantage-maximising 
institutions, but as complex organisations which exceed their goals and functions, 
but in non-utilitarian ways.  Their language, their scripts, their histories, their 
techno-structures and artefacts matter; analysis of which reveals them to be 
trapped in their own evolutionary logic but also constantly at work to renew 
themselves.  Consequently, we have witnessed the ‘opening up’ of GPE from its 
economistic and material base to broader question of history and culture.  
 For such post-rationalist GPE, which is a truly diverse and broad movement, 
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the significance of Foucault’s work in particular cannot be underestimated. Among 
other things Foucault problematised the concept of agency in a way that places 
Marxism (after Marx) and mainstream political economy firmly in the camp of 
‘rationalism’. Foucault’s studies of power and discipline have demonstrated that 
historical change comes about at least in part through collective agencies that 
cannot be defined as institutions or as social classes, but are contingent forms of 
alliances and identities emergent in discourse. In Discipline and Punish (1977), for 
instance, Foucault identifies a group of reformers that innovate new forms of 
discipline and power. These ‘regional’ studies then provided the basis for his 
research into the history of subjectivity, or the very historical conditions that have 
produced the modern subject and modern rationality as the underlying 
‘infrastructure’ of modern capitalism.  
 Today’s critical wing of global political economy is a mixture but not a 
synthesis of Marxist, institutionalist and poststructuralist thought.  Marxism 
provides us with a strong hypothesis of about the long-term trajectories of 
capitalism. But Marxism has proved particularly weak in predicting or prescribing 
short to medium term trends. The challenge then is to bridge the broad social 
critique of Marxism with the robust empirical bent of institutionalism and 
post-structuralism. 
 
1.7. Between economics, political economy and global political economy 
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Ortodoxy and heterodoxy have adopted diametrically opposed views of the nature 
and purpose of interdisciplinary research, their conception of the nature and 
boundaries of GPE differs as well. To the rationalists, particularly to methodological 
individualist GPE, the boundary between GPE and other disciplines is clearer: GPE 
is a sub-field of International Relations and political science which stands at the 
intersection between domestic and international politics, on the one hand, and trade 
and finance, on the other. However, as Carlson (chapter 8) notes, in recognition of 
the fact that states do not engage in trade, individuals and firms do, states only 
determine the terms of trade, contemporary rationalist GPE has tended to 
disagregate states and encompass ‘domestic’ determinant of trade policy. 
 The broadly critical tradition in the social sciences is naturally attracted to 
holistic interpretations of social relations. The assumption being that there are 
totalising processes driven by a predominant logic which we call capitalism, and 
that such totalising processes manifest themselves in all aspect of social life. The 
critical traditions maintains therefore that there is no point in studying each facet 
of social life as an independent system of relationships -- for the simple reason that 
they are not independent but interdependent. Consequently the critical traditions 
does not accept the analytical legitimacy of formal academic divisions. The critical 
tradition is then divided between its rationalist and post-rationalist wings. 
 There is a subtle but important difference between totalising processes and 
the concept of a totality. Totalising means, a system of thought and practices which 
seeks to universalise and dominate its surroundings, such systems are 
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expansionary but they never truly obtain their aim: they never create a truly total 
system. In that case there is no one neither concept, nor one set of dynamics or 
rationale that can provide a full or even partial explanation for even events. 
Everything is complex and multifaceted. Consequently, a system of thought that is 
grounded in the assumption of totalising processes is evolutionary, historicist, 
non-teleological and often accepting of eclecticism; a system of thought premised on 
the assumption that the world ‘out there’ is a totality, a whole, tends to privilege 
homeostasis, equilibrium and lack of history.  Political economy that seeks to 
incorporate all these variables and more specifically, apply them in a systemic study 
of the economic system tends to be critical, evolutionary and dynamic.  
 We can see now how the notion of totalising processes forces a distinct 
interpretation of the relationship between GPE and political economy. Since there is 
no one global system (a totality), the international cannot be treated as a separate 
realm, but as an important ingredient of societal theories. And yet, the uniqueness 
of the institution of the state and sovereignty should not be ignored. Consequently, 
political economy in principle is indistinguishable from international political 
economy, in the sense that good political economy is international in character and 
vice versa. But if we were to insist on a distinction, then I would argue that while 
political economy is grounded in a theory of the State, critical GPE supplements it 
by offering a theory of states, of the plurality of states, or more appropriately, 
critical GPE seek to develop a theory of the nature of a transnational economy 
operating within a system of fragmented political authority.  Whereas political 
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economy has tended to concentrate on the analytical as well as prescriptive question 
of how order and change come about in a ‘social formation’ – its theorising is 
predicated on the assumption that each social formation is subject to its own 
autonomous set of dynamics, critical international or global political economy 
changes the order of question, it ask how order and change come about in a system 
of fragmented political authority. The very discontinuity between the political and 
economic spaces is one of major sources of continuing change in the international 
political economy.  
 Although deeply divided and heterogeneous, there is still therefore a line 
threading its way through the fascinating maze of conflicting and multifaceted 
topography of the social sciences and political economy, a line that can be rightfully 
described as IPE and GPE. It has to do, fundamentally, with the unique 
problematic of the operation of the modern economy within a fragmented political 
system.  
                                                 
i
 I gratefully acknowledge the constructive comments on earlier draft of this introduction from 
Lisa Carslon, Raymond Dacey, Earl Gammon and Duncan Wigan.  
ii
 The term ‘critical tradition’ or ‘traditions’ does not imply (and often indeed is not) analytical or 
theoretical rigor. The term critical tradition is generally reserved to those studies that take a 
critical view of the status quo and explicitly seek to replace the predominant form of power 
structures, be they capitalism, industrialisation or the prevailing gender and race power 
relationships with what they see as more just and equitable social arrangements. The term critical 
tradition should not be confused with critical theory, otherwise known as the Frankfurt school 
tradition of Marxist thought.  
iii
  States and markets is the title of another famous book, Susan Strange’s (1988). Strange, 
however, chose this title in irony to convey her criticism of the then reigning orthodoxy in IPE. 
She deeply regreted her choice as clearly she became associated with the state and market 
approach to IPE. 
iv
 For discussion see Nitzan and Bichler, chapter five this volume.  
v
  For an excellent analysis see Screpanti 1998 
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vi
  This section draws on Amin and Palan, 2001. 
 
 
